The Economic Complexity Index (ECI; Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009 ) measures the complexity of national economies in terms of product groups. Analogously to ECI, a Patent Complexity Index (PatCI) can be developed on the basis of a matrix of nations versus patent classes. Using linear algebra, the three dimensions-countries, product groups, and patent classes-can be combined into a measure of "Triple Helix" complexity (THCI) including the trilateral interaction terms between knowledge production, wealth generation, and (national) control. THCI can be expected to capture the extent of systems integration between the global dynamics of markets (ECI) and technologies (PatCI) in each national system of innovation. We measure ECI, PatCI, and THCI during the period 2000-2014 for the 34 OECD member states, the BRICS countries, and a group of emerging and affiliated economies (Argentina, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Romania, and Singapore). The three complexity indicators are correlated between themselves; but the correlations with GDP per capita are virtually absent. Of the world's major economies, Japan scores highest on all three indicators, while China has been increasingly successful in combining economic and technological complexity. We could not reproduce the correlation between ECI and average income that has been central to the argument about the fruitfulness of the economic complexity approach.
Introduction
proposed the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) using the portfolios of countries in terms of product groups which they export to quantify a country's economic complexity. A country's economic growth and income can be expected to depend on the diversity of the products in its portfolio (Cadot et al., 2013) . Given the two axes of the matrix of countries versus product groups, Hausmann et al. (2011, p. 24 ) also introduced the product complexity index (PCI) which measures the spread of the production of each product group over nations. The complexity of a country's economy, in turn, refers to the set of capabilities, accumulated by that country.
According to Hidalgo & Hausmann (2009; henceforth HH) ECI is correlated with a country's income as measured by GDP per capita (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009: Fig. 3 at p. 10573) . HH submit that the deviation of ECI from a country's income can be used to predict long-term future growth because a country's income can be expected to approach a competitive level associated with its economic complexity (Ourens, 2013, p. 24) . 5 Hence, ECI could be considered as a predictive measure of a country's competitive advantage in the future.
Since based on the product portfolios, ECI values can be expected to reflect the manufacturing capabilities of countries (Hausmann et al, 2011, p. 7) . However, HH did not provide an explicit definition of the manufacturing capabilities and their respective knowledge bases. In our opinion, manufacturing complexity is inevitably related to the knowledge intensity and sophistication of exports of products with comparative advantages (e.g., Foray, 2004; Foray & Lundvall, 1996; OECD, 1996; ECR, 2013) . One needs an advanced indicator of competitiveness which indicates whether manufacturing industries in a country have a relatively high degree of complexity.
New industries are more likely to be generated in regions where they can be technologically related to existing industries (Boschma et al., 2013; Frenken et al., 2007; Neffke et al., 2011) . Although regional diversification is often studied in terms of industrial dynamics, specification of the technological (knowledge) dynamics would enable us to make a direct link between urban diversification and technology portfolios. Boschma et al. (2014, at p. 225) , for example, concluded from a study of 366 US cities during the period 1981-2010 that "technological relatedness at the city level was a crucial driving force behind technological change in US cities over the past 30 years."
Arguing that the knowledge dimension is "intangible," Cristelli et al. (2013) proposed to model capabilities as a hidden layer between products and countries. In a series of studies, Luciano Pietronero and his colleagues (e.g. Cristelli et al., 2015; Tacchella et al., 2013) have further developed this alternative model of economic complexity from a data-driven perspective.
The resulting models predict GDP and other economic parameters in much detail. From the perspective of innovation studies, however, there remains a need for an explicit measure of the technological capabilities of nations. Can the missing link between product groups and technology (patent) portfolios be endogenized into the model (Nelson & Winter, 1977 , 1982 instead of being handled as a residual (Solow, 1957) or latent factor? Proponents of endogenous growth theory, for example, have argued that economic growth is the result of combinations of technologies and manufacturing (Romer, 1986) . The longer-term research question is how to compare (national) systems of innovation in terms of their efficiency in coupling the global dynamics of markets and technologies at the level of firms, institutions, and nations (Freeman & Perez, 1988; Lundval, 1988 and 1992; Nelson, 1992; Reikard, 2005) .
In this study, we address this question step by step. In addition and analogously to HH's product diversity, the technological diversity of a country can be measured, for example, in terms of patent portfolios. Patents have been considered as a measure of innovative activity in the innovation studies literature (e.g., Arcs & Audretsch, 2002) , although patents are indicators of invention, not innovation. However, it is less problematic to consider patents as indicators of the dynamics of technological knowledge (Alkemade et al., 2015; Verspagen, 2007) . Patents can also be strategic (Blind et al., 2006; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; cf. Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2002) .
Using the patent portfolio as a proxy for the technological complexity of a country, we first develop the Patent Complexity Index (PatCI; cf. Balland et al., 2016) . We then use patentproduct concordance tables to construct a third matrix of product groups versus technology classes. In a three-partite network of relations among countries, product groups, and patent categories, each third category can be expected to provide feedbacks or feed-forwards on the relation between the other two. The feedbacks and feed-forwards generate loops that can provide new options, synergies, and integration (Petersen et al., 2016) . The endogenization of the technological dimension in a three-partite network will enable us to derive a "Triple Helix"-type indicator for the measurement of relative integration in national systems of innovation.
Since the model is developed at the macro-level of nations, the empirical elaboration can be policy relevant at that level. We follow HH's choice for data at this macro-level. Our model is therefore not micro-founded. From a formal perspective, however, one can similarly (alternatively) study the relations among firms, product groups, and patent classes as another empirical domain; but using the same algorithms. More generally, one can argue that positive feedback in the cycling among three dimensions models the potential synergy in the interactions, whereas negative feedback models a form of institutional lock-in. In empirical cases, both processes can be expected to operate simultaneously. Accordingly, the Triple Helix Complexity Indicator (THCI) derived below evaluates the resulting configuration by aggregating two dynamics: the organizational and integrating dynamics of localized retention and the selforganizing dynamics of markets and the techno-sciences as globalizing selection environments (Leydesdorff et al., 2017, in press) . One can also consider the cycling as a form of auto-catalysis that has the potential to bi-furcate and thus develop long-term cycles (Ulanowicz, 2009; cf. Ivanova & Leydesdorff, 2015) . 
Methods

a) Economic Complexity Index
HH's ECI is derived from a matrix , where the index refers to a country and refers to a product group. The matrix elements are assumed to be one if Balassa's (1965) RCA is larger than or equal to one and otherwise zero:
where , is the value of product manufactured by country . According to HH (at p. 10571) "a country can be considered to be a significant exporter of product p if its Revealed Comparative Advantage (the share of product p in the export basket of product p in world trade) is greater than 1" (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009, p. 10571) .
Summing the elements of matrix , by rows (countries), one obtains a vector with components referring to the corresponding products and indicating a measure of product ubiquity relative to the world market. The sum of matrix elements over the columns (products) provides another vector defining the diversity of a country's exports:
Where is defined as the number of countries and as the number of product groups-HH use =178 and =4948; see section 3 below-more accurate measures of diversity and ubiquity can be obtained by adding the following iterations:
HH (at p. 10571) call this "the method of reflections" (MR): each product is weighted proportionally to its ubiquity on the market, and each country is weighted proportionally to the country's diversity. Substituting the first equation of system (3) into the second, one obtains:
Because empirically the sequence , converges to a limit equation (4) can be formulated as a matrix equation:
where vector ⃗ is a limit of iterations, as follows:
HH introduce the economic complexity index (ECI) as an eigenvector ⃗ of the matrix
associated with the second largest eigenvalue, because it can be shown mathematically that in this case eigenvectors associated with the second largest eigenvalue capture most of the variation (Kemp Benedict, 2014) . ECI is then defined according to the formula
ECI is a vector of which the components refer to the respective countries.
b) Patent Complexity Index
HH hypothesize that diversity and ubiquity scores of the countries reflect underlying "capabilities." By capabilities they imply the ability of countries to make corresponding products; but this concept can also be extended to technologies. The corresponding technologies are legally documented as patents. Patents can be used as a proxy measure for technological capabilities. Using an analogous design, one can construct a matrix , , which is essentially matrix , in which the product groups, indicated by index p, are substituted by patent technology classes, indicated by index t (Balland et al., 2016) . Following the MR formalism explained above (Eqs. 2-8), one can derive a matrix , ′ , equivalent to , ′ in Eq. 7, as follows:
and the Patent Complexity Index (PatCI) is estimated in accordance with Eq. (8), as follows:
The condition for the RCA index is in this case:
where , is a number of patents possessed by a country c in a patent group p counted on the integer or fractional base. This condition is met when the weight of a technology group in a country's portfolio exceeds the average weight in the set. In other words, the country is specialized in this specific technology. Diversity and ubiquity scores (Eq.3) would reflect each country's technological diversification and the prevalence of a particular technology in its portfolio, respectively.
In summary, PatCI captures the technological diversification of a country expressed in terms of patent portfolios. Note that this measure is volatile when applied to small and less developed countries as compared with more developed ones, because in the case of small and less developed countries small changes in the number of patents may lead to disproportionate changes in PatCI. For this reason, we will limit the presentation of the measurement results of PatCI (in Section 4) to large and medium-sized economies.
c) The three complexity sets HH (2009, p. 10570) noted that "the bipartite network connecting countries to products is a result of tripartite network connecting countries to their available capabilities and products to the capabilities they require." However, ECI is a two-dimensional indicator, since the third (i.e., technological) dimension is not explicitly accounted for. After adding the technological dimension in terms of patent classes, this dimension can also be explicitly combined with the first two ones-countries and product groups. In addition to the matrices , and , , one thus obtains a third matrix , , in which index refers to product groups and to patent classes. In other words: a specific technology can be used in different product groups, and product groups can combine different technology classes. We thus infer that technologies can be related to products to variable extents.
As a matrix , can be taken patent-product concordance table in which product groups are linked to patent classes (e.g., van Looy et al., 2015) . The corresponding elements of the matrix , are equal to 1 if product group p comprises technology class t, and 0 otherwise. Note that this matrix may empirically be sparse, since many products are not related to patents and the distribution of patents over classes is very skewed.
Analogously to Eq. 2, one can define a product-technology diversity vector ,0 and a technology-ubiquity vector ,0 as follows:
In Eq. 11 ,0 represents technological sophistication of a product (i.e., how many different technologies are comprised in the product). Combining more technologies in a product makes it more "complex": ,0 measures the ubiquity of a technology over different product groups.
Following the iterative procedure described above, one is now able to construct three groups of vectors:
which are connected by the following iterative sequences:
in the country-product dimension:
in country-technology dimension:
and in product-technology dimension:
where ,0 measures country product diversity, ,0 is product ubiquity over the set of countries, ,0 is country technological diversity, ,0 is technological ubiquity, ,0 is technological ubiquity with respect to products (i.e. how a specific technology is distributed across manufactured products), and ,0 is product technological sophistication (how many technologies are used in each product group). Each of these vectors can be associated with a corresponding complexity index. One thus obtains:
1. economic (ECI) and product group (PCI) complexity indices for the first group; 2. patent (PatCI) and technology (TCI) complexity indices for the second group; 3. product-technology (PTCI) and technology-product (TPCI) complexity indices for the third group.
The iterative couplings within each set generate three double-stranded helices corresponding to three bi-partite networks; but the interaction terms among the three helices are not yet included since these networks are not explicitly interconnected.
d) Triple-Helix Complexity Index
In the case of bi-lateral networks, described by Eqs. 15-17, the vector pairs are reciprocally interdependent, but the three pairs are not interacting. This is schematically depicted in Fig. 1a : the three groups of vectors are not connected to one another. In case of three-lateral network, however, we connect countries, technologies, and products in a cyclic manner, as depicted in Figs. 1b and c. HH formulated as follows: "a country makes a product if it has all the necessary capabilities" and "the bipartite network connecting countries to products is a result of the tripartite network connecting countries to their available capabilities and products to the capabilities they require" (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009, p.10571) . In other words, if a country possess or has access to a technology then it can produce the product, and vice versa -producing a product enables a country to further develop the corresponding technologies. In other words, these networks can be mapped as two cycles-country-technology-product and country-producttechnology-which add to each other. If the clockwise cycle in Fig. 1b refers to a countrytechnology-product network, the counter-clockwise cycle in Fig. 1c refers to a country-producttechnology network. The two cyclical configurations can analytically be distinguished, but operate empirically as feedback mechanisms on each other: local retention feeds back on the feed-forward in loops.
This can be modeled as follows: three groups of vectors were distinguished in Eqs. 12-14 relating to the geographical ( , , , ), product ( , , , ), and technological ( , , , ) dimensions, respectively. One can extend this model with two groups of three vectors each relating to the other dimensions as follows:
1. clockwise (country-technology-product-country as in Fig. 1b) :
2. and counter-clockwise (country-product-technology-country as in Fig. 1c ):
The set of Equations (18) refers to clockwise cyclical interdependence (Fig. 1b) ; and the set of Equations (19) corresponds to counter-clockwise cyclical interdependence (Fig. 1c) . In the case of cyclical interdependencies, each iterative step between two indicators is conditioned by the value of the third one. The two cycles (clockwise and counter-clockwise) operate in parallel, since they are coupled in the parameters. 6 As noted, cyclical interdependence can also be considered as an auto-catalytic process (Ulanowicz, 2009) ; the alternative rotation provides the stabilizing feedback term to the globalizing feed forward of the auto-catalysis. Note that the cycles represent second-order relations among first-order relations, and not relations among the agents (nations, product groups, and patent classes) that are bilaterally related.
This structure of three mutually coupled dimensions shows an analogy with the Triple Helix (TH) model of innovations. In the TH model, three institutional actors (university, industry, and government) are expected to perform three functions: knowledge (technology) generation, (product) manufacturing, and legislative regulation respectively. Using a generalized TH model (e.g., Ivanova & Leydesdorff, 2014) , the geographical dimension (countries) can be considered as a proxy for administrative regulation and legislation by government, technology classes as a proxy for the innovative knowledge dimension, and product groups as indicators of economic activity (cf. Petersen et al., 2016) . In the TH model, the one cycle is associated with institutional organization and integration, and the other with "self-organization" and differentiation at the global level of markets and technologies (Leydesdorff & Zawdie, 2010) .
The trade-off between these two dynamics shapes a specific (e.g., national) system of innovation in terms of the efficiency of its integration and synergy (Petersen et al., 2006) .
Each of the vectors in the iterative sequences defined by Eqs. (18) and (19) is modulated by the other vectors in cycles. After substituting the second and third equation from the system of Eq. (18) into the first one and eliminating , −1 and , −2 one obtains:
( 20) which can conveniently be written as a matrix equation:
where vector ⃗ is the limit value of iterations for n → ∞.
and matrix has elements
In a similar way from Eq. 19 one can get:
where:
Proceeding in this way, the task of finding complexity coefficients in analogy to HH's argument, can be reformulated as a problem of linear algebra, and one can show that the maximum variability is captured by the eigenvector of with the largest eigenvalue less than one (KempBenedict, 2014) .
In other words, these three-mode networks can be considered as an elaboration of the TH model-operationalized in terms of countries (geography), product groups (industry), and patent classes (technological knowledge). The interactions among the three helices in the two cycles can be formalized as the Triple-Helix Complexity Index (THCI), as follows:
where ⃗ is a complexity vector obtained via summing complexity vectors obtained for the clockwise direction ⃗ (+)and the complexity vector obtained for the counter-clockwise rotation ⃗ (−), so that the evolution of the system can be defined as the result of interactions between the clockwise and counter-clockwise rotations, as follows:
THCI plays a unifying role in steering the complexity of products and technologies by adding complexity in the institutional (e.g., national) coupling (Freeman & Perez, 1988) . Since the couplings evolve in terms of second-order relations, next-order cycles (e.g., technological regimes) can be expected to operate on the observable relations (e.g., technological trajectories; Dosi, 1982) .
Data
We use the same data source for the measurement of ECI (Scheu et al., 2006; Veefkind et al., 2012) .
3-digit level as indicators of the technological dimension (however imperfect)
. 10 We use USPTO because patents at USPTO have been considered as more competitive for emerging markets than patents filed with other national or regional patent offices (Criscuolo, 2004; Jaffe & Trajtenburg, 2002) . Patents are assigned fractionally to countries according to inventor addresses.
A disadvantage of using USPTO data can be the relatively large changes between years in the matrix of countries versus patent classes for small economies. For example, one cannot expect a country like Slovakia to maintain a comparable patent portfolio in each year (Lengyel et al., 2015) . Given this limitation in our data, we focus the discussion of empirical examples on large (e.g., the US and China) and medium-sized countries (e.g., France and Germany).
To link patents to product groups we used Eurostat ICP-NACE concordance tables (van 10 IPC and CPC codes are similar at the three and four-digit level.
Results
The results of the computation of ECI, PatCI, and THCI for 45 countries during the period 2000-2014 are provided in Appendices 1, 2, and 3, respectively. This information enables us to compare both the relations between and among indicators in each year, and the development of the three indicators over time. We added two lines to Table 1 with the logarithms of the average income (=GDP/population) and the average number of patents per inhabitant. HH found a positive correlation between ECI and the average income, but we find a (non-significant) negative correlation. As expected, the two measures -ln(GDP/population) and ln(Patents/population) -correlate highly and significantly with each other because of the underlying correlations.
(However, GDP/population can not be used on par with Patents/population, since the identical measure to Patents/population is Export value/population. Since both these measures are not correlated with the three complexity indices using our sample of the 45 relatively advanced economies, the predictive value of ECI can not be confirmed by our analysis (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009: Fig. 3 at p. 10573; cf. Ourens, 2013) . Our different sample choice may be one of the factors involved: Hausmann et al. (2011, p. 30) show that the effect of the ECI values on economic growth decreases in more developed countries. Furthermore, spurious correlations will be more prevalent in the more diversified portfolios of advanced countries. In that case, ECI would measure catching up, more than movements at the frontier of techno-economic complexity.
In order to explore this conjecture, we tested for an extended set of 119 countries at 2-digit level (SITC Rev.3) and found a remarkably higher correlation with the logarithm of GDP per capita (PPP) ( Before we turn to a comparison among countries, let us first show ( Figure 3 ) the development of the three complexity indicators for the U.S.A. Given our use of USPTO data, one can consider PatCI to be well-defined in this case. The use of USPTO data for other countries should be considered as a proxy, and using USPTO may be an unfortunate choice for small nations (as noted above). Can THCI be perhaps considered as an early indicator? Table 3 shows positive Spearman correlations between THCI and ECI when the values of THCI are two years lagged in comparison to ECI. The value of Spearman's rho is 0.58242; p<.05). The association between the two variables can thus be considered statistically significant. In Figure 3 , we penciled the linear regression lines in as auxiliary lines. The trends of ECI and THCI are both significant (p < .01), whereas the trend of PatCI is not significant. 11 One can test the monotonicity of an increase or decrease for its significance using Spearman's rank-order correlation ρ between the time-series data and the consecutive dates, because the latter by definition increase monotonously (Sheskin, 2011 (Sheskin, , p. 1374 .
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Comparisons among countries
Let us now compare some of the world's major economies (US, China, Japan, Germany, UK, and France). We added Russia and Canada to enrich the picture: the Canadian economy is an interesting companion to the US economy while Russia can be expected to show a different pattern. exhibits the highest value in the group of ECI, and Japan shows the highest value of PatCI. In other words, the (non-linear) dynamics of local organization versus globalization are very different for these two countries. The US, Canada, and UK seem to share a pattern, but the economic complexity of Canada is far less than that of the UK or US. ECI is most negative for the Russian Federation, whereas France and Germany seem to form an in-between group.
The pattern of significantly lower values of ECI for Canada and the Russian Federation is confirmed by the time series of ECI for these eight countries provided in Figure 5 . shows that even for these relatively large economies, the variation in PatCI among years can be considerable. Nevertheless, Japan outperforms the other countries on this indicator in all the years under study. Figure 7 shows that Japan has a relatively stable national integration in terms of THCI, whereas for China the value of this indicator is increasing.
Germany follows in the third place, whereas the Anglo-Saxon nations are relatively oriented towards the other rotation ( Figures 1b and 1c) ; in other words, they are geared towards open markets and international patenting. The Russian Federation ranks last in the group because of a deficit in the integration at the national level (Leydesdorff, Perevodchikov, and Uvarov, 2015) . 
Discussion and conclusions
We argue that Hidalgo and Hausmann's Method of Reflections (MR) was only defined for economic complexity, although the authors noted that manufacturing capabilities are grounded in "capabilities" which imply knowledge-based technologies. In this study we showed how the technological dimension can be endogenized by extending MR to patent classes in analogy to product groups, and then the interaction terms can also be specified. Thus, we first defined a Patent Complexity Index (PatCI); using the country-patent matrix, ECI and PatCI were combined into the new THCI indicator. This indicator is informationally richer than either ECI or PatCI because the interaction terms can be included.
Using MR, each of the bi-lateral couplings can be considered as a helix based on the coevolution between the respective dimensions of the corresponding matrix. The three mutually recursive formulas in the product, patent, and country dimensions can also be combined into a triangular configuration that allows for both clockwise and counter-clockwise circulation. The trade-off between the two can be captured as the Triple-Helix Complexity Index (THCI) that models the specificity of (e.g., national) systems of innovation. Systems of innovation are thus considered as the result of competition in the globalizing selection environments of markets and technologies versus (nationally organized) retention mechanisms (Freeman & Perez, 1988) . In the one direction, the three helices drive one another towards systems integration; in the other direction, they lead towards differentiation and hence absorption of complexity. This model follows analytically from the MR in the complexity approach, that is, without further assumptions.
Testing the model against empirical data, we found the following results:
1. The three indicators (ECI, PatCI, THCI) are highly correlated; it is likely that all three indicators measure a latent dimension in the complexity of (national) innovation systems; 2. Our ECI values can be considered as a partial replication of HH's (2009) study albeit tested on a smaller set of 45 countries and at another (3-digit) level aggregation. Using a sample and time horizon different from HH, we were not able to reproduce the correlation between ECI and average income that has been central to the argument about the fruitfulness of the economic complexity approach. We showed that this may be caused by the fact that we only used data of a limited set of relatively developed countries and three digits instead of four digits in the product classes. A further extension of country dataset considerably improved the situation. In other words, it follows that ECI of HH is a predictor of average income at the aggregate level more than at the level of nations.
3. As to be expected, countries differ in terms of each of these indicators. Interestingly, some national systems differ across the three indicators in terms of the sign (positive or negative) despite the prevailing correlation at the level of the set. For example, France is positively assigned in terms of ECI, but negatively (with respect to the average value over the group) in terms of PatCI and THCI. A possible explanation is that French inventors patent at a below average rate in the US, whereas France's economic complexity is above average. Without repeating the analysis using data from all major patent offices, one cannot distinguish whether this is particular to France, or a limitation of the analytical procedure and the operationalization; 4. Among the major economies, Japan scores highest on all three indicators but loses ground in terms of national integration, whereas China has been increasingly successful in combining economic and technological complexity. The U.S. is assigned values below average on all three complexity indicators.
We followed HH in using available macro-level statistics. The attribution of patent classes or product groups to countries, however, requires careful elaboration (Alkemade et al., 2015) . When a country produces a product it may possess the corresponding technology, but the technology can also be outsourced. The manufacturing may be transferred to another country without technology transfer. The underlying dynamics among firms in terms of mergers and acquisitions are not captured when focusing on the macro-level of nations. While information about knowledge production and use should undoubtedly inform an indicator of innovation complexity, further research is required to capture the technological dimension in a meaningful way. For example, one would have to define a measure which plays the role of GDP/population in the technological domain.
Normative implications
The search for indicators of an economy's knowledge base that are, on the one hand, not external to the economy (as are most science & technology indicators) yet on the other hand, endogenize technological developments as capacities has been a major driver of the research program of the OECD (David & Foray, 1995; Foray & Lundvall, 1996) . In an evaluation of these efforts, Godin (2006) concluded that they mainly had led to a re-organization and relabeling of existing indicators.
Within the context of Triple-Helix (TH) research, mutual information among three (or more) dimensions has been developed as an indicator of synergy and integration in the economy's knowledge base (e.g., Leydesdorff & Fritsch, 2006) . However, this synergy indicator has several problems, such as: (1) it is measured in bits of information, which is an abstract entropy measure and cannot be directly related to basic economic measures (such as turnover, income, etc.); and (2) as a systems measure, synergy cannot be decomposed proportionally among the three sub-dynamics-technological trajectories, market selections, and control mechanisms-governing the TH's evolution. In this study, we propose a solution of this problem by elaborating the complexity approach in two and three dimensions.
We showed that ECI can analytically be elaborated into a Triple Helix Complexity
Indicator of innovation systems. Thus, it is possible to generalize the Method of Reflections to include the interactions among the three relevant dimensions: countries, products, and technologies. Endogenization of the technological dimension could mean that this methodology would have a better potential to accurately predict a country's economic growth. In this sense, the current study can be considered as a contribution to the longer-term effort to study complexity as a measure of innovation systems and the knowledge base of an economy (Frenken et al., 2007; Ivanova & Leydesdorff, 2014) .
Given the state of the art, it is perhaps too early for the formulation of normative advice.
One could explore first whether the indicators can be improved and made more meaningful. For example, the choice of RCA (Balassa, 1965) as a binary threshold implies throwing away a lot of information in the valued (!) data. Petersen et al. (2016) found that their information-theoretical indicator of synergy in innovation systems did no longer work after a reduction to a binary reflection. Valued variants of ECI, PatCI, and THCI may provide us with stronger predictors. 
